The nature of Central Bank Independence: historical background and rise in the era of financialization

Vol. 44 No. 3 (2024)

Jul-Sep / 2024
Published July 5, 2024
PDF-Portuguese (Português (Brasil))
PDF-Portuguese (Português (Brasil))

How to Cite

Rodriguez, Rodrigo Siqueira. 2024. “The Nature of Central Bank Independence: Historical Background and Rise in the Era of Financialization”. Brazilian Journal of Political Economy 44 (3):583-99. https://doi.org/10.1590/0101-31572024-3575.

The nature of Central Bank Independence: historical background and rise in the era of financialization

Rodrigo Siqueira Rodriguez
Departamento de Evolução Econômica, Universidade Estadual do Rio de Janeiro – UERJ, Rio de Janeiro/RJ, Brasil.
Brazilian Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 44 No. 3 (2024), Jul-Sep / 2024, Pages 583-599

Abstract

This article brings back the debate on central bank independence from its historical
origins and its relation to financialization. With financial dominance, States have less influence
over central bank policies as they gain greater action capacity through monetary policy
strengthening. Central bank independence is an expression of financialization as it makes
the monetary authority more susceptible to financial market pressures and simultaneously
limits the participation of the State and society in conducting monetary policy.

JEL Classification: E58; B26.


Keywords: Central bank independence financialization rentier accumulation