Fiscal reform and federal relations: Brasilian deadlocks

Vol. 29 No. 1 (2009)

Jan-Mar / 2009
Published January 1, 2009
PDF-English
PDF-English

How to Cite

Aguirre, Basilia Maria Baptista, and Guilherme Leite da Silva Dias. 2009. “Fiscal Reform and Federal Relations: Brasilian Deadlocks”. Brazilian Journal of Political Economy 29 (1):43-61. https://centrodeeconomiapolitica.org.br/repojs/index.php/journal/article/view/469.

Fiscal reform and federal relations: Brasilian deadlocks

Basilia Maria Baptista Aguirre
professora livre-docente da Faculdade de Economia e Administração da Universidade de São Paulo, FEA/USP
Guilherme Leite da Silva Dias
professor titular da Faculdade de Economia e Administração da Universidade de São Paulo, FEA/USP
Brazilian Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 29 No. 1 (2009), Jan-Mar / 2009, Pages 43-61

Abstract

Brazilian fiscal reform got to deadlocks because proposals tried to avoid considering federal relations. There are two main types of federal relations: the competitive and the cooperative. In both types is possible to observe coordination mechanisms. Brazilian federalism is a mixture of both types what leads to difficulties finding solutions. We argue that is more important to find mechanisms to facilitate cooperation than to discuss the qualities of any alternative fiscal structure. Fiscal reforms brings along a great deal of uncertainty. So it is important to discuss the reform timing and the compensation mechanisms before hand.

JEL Classification: H70.


Keywords: federalism fiscal reform transaction costs