Central Bank transparency: an analysis of the Brazilian case.

Vol. 30 No. 1 (2010)

jan-Mar / 2010
Published January 1, 2010
PDF-Portuguese (Português (Brasil))
PDF-Portuguese (Português (Brasil))

How to Cite

Mendonça, Helder Ferreira de, and Adriana Inhudes. 2010. “Central Bank Transparency: An Analysis of the Brazilian Case.”. Brazilian Journal of Political Economy 30 (1):159-77. https://centrodeeconomiapolitica.org.br/repojs/index.php/journal/article/view/436.

Central Bank transparency: an analysis of the Brazilian case.

Helder Ferreira de Mendonça
Adriana Inhudes
Brazilian Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 30 No. 1 (2010), jan-Mar / 2010, Pages 159-177

Abstract

Nowadays there is a tendency among central banks of increasing transparency in the conduction of the monetary policy. After the adoption of inflation targeting in Brazil there was an increase in the communication of the Central Bank of Brazil with the public. This paper makes a brief review of the recent theoretical and empirical literature concerning this subject. Furthermore, an analysis due to the transparency in the conduction of Brazilian monetary policy on important macroeconomic variables is made. The findings denote that an increase in transparency improves the behavior of several macroeconomic variables.

JEL classification: E52, E43.


Keywords: transparency monetary policy inflation targeting