Central Bank Independence and Fiscal equilibrium

Vol. 26 No. 1 (2006)

Jan-Mar / 2006
Published March 27, 2020
PDF-Portuguese (Português (Brasil))
PDF-Portuguese (Português (Brasil))

How to Cite

Mendonça, Helder Ferreira de. 2006. “Central Bank Independence and Fiscal Equilibrium: Some Observations for the Brazilian Case”. Brazilian Journal of Political Economy 26 (1):23-38. https://centrodeeconomiapolitica.org.br/repojs/index.php/journal/article/view/588.
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Central Bank Independence and Fiscal equilibrium

Some observations for the Brazilian Case

Helder Ferreira de Mendonça
Professor do Departamento de Economia da Universidade Federal Fluminense e pesquisador do CNPq.
Brazilian Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 26 No. 1 (2006), Jan-Mar / 2006, Pages 23-38

Abstract

The objective of this paper is to analyze the main theoretical arguments for the analysis of the conduction of monetary policy on the fiscal side. Besides this, an analysis is made of the possible effects on the fiscal balance from the conduction of the monetary policy in the search for price stability after the Real Plan and due to an increase in the central bank independence (CBI) in the Brazilian case. The findings denote that the strategy for the conduction of the adopted monetary policy and the increase in the degree of CBI did not contribute to an improvement in the fiscal balance.

JEL Classification: E58; E63.


Keywords: central bank independence inflation public debt

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